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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Illinois General Assembly may limit damages for certain claims by 
setting caps or by recognizing exclusions for certain or all damages via no 
duty or immunity statutes.  Caps have been successfully challenged on 
separation of powers grounds.1  Exclusions have traditionally been 
challenged on Illinois constitutional right to a remedy grounds, with early 
success in 1946, but with failures since 1958.  The most recent failure 
occurred in the Illinois Second District Appellate Court case, Murphy v. 
Colson, decided in October of 2013.2  Unfortunately, that ruling, and its 
predecessors, leaves some continuing uncertainties about right to remedy 
constraints on statutory damage exclusions and even greater uncertainties 
about other constitutional constraints.  How might the right to remedy 
constrain future statutory damage exclusions for certain injuries or for certain 
claims?  And what other constitutional principles constrain? 
 
                                                                                                                           
*  Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby College; J.D., The 
University of Chicago. 
1.  See, e.g., Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217 (2010).  The separation of powers 
approach is critiqued, and alternative approaches suggested, in Jeffrey A. Parness, State Damage 
Caps and Separation of Powers, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 145 (2011) (preferring a judicial rulemaking 
approach). 
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II.  MURPHY V. COLSON 
The damage exclusions challenged on right to remedy grounds in 
Murphy appear in the Alienation of Affections Act3 and the Criminal 
Conversation Act,4 which “contain parallel language.”5  The Acts each 
exclude “punitive, exemplary, vindictive, or aggravated damages.”6  These 
exclusions were not challenged.  The Acts also each exclude “mental anguish 
. . . any injury to plaintiff’s feelings; shame, humiliation, sorrow or 
mortification . . . defamation or injury to the good name and character of 
plaintiff or his or her spouse . . . [and] dishonor to plaintiff’s family.”7  These 
nonpunitive damage exclusions were sustained in Murphy based on two 
Illinois Supreme Court precedents, in 1958 and 1960, which were said to 
limit a 1946 precedent.8 
A.  Pre-Murphy Precedents on Illinois Constitutional Remedial Rights 
In 1946, in Heck v. Schupp,9 the high court invalidated a statute banning 
all claims “based upon alienation of affections, criminal conversation, or 
breach of contract to marry.”10  Besides enactment contrary to the Illinois 
constitutional “one subject” mandate,11 the statutes violated the Illinois 
constitutional right to a remedy as there was “no reason” to distinguish 
between contracts that do and do not involve marriage,12 and because claims 
for criminal conversation and alienation of affections involve interests which 
all members of an affected family “have a right to protect,”13 “clearly” falling 
within the constitutional remedial right and promoting the “sense of 
justice.”14 
Responding to Heck in 1997, the Illinois General Assembly passed the 
Alienation of Affections,15 Breach of Promise (a.k.a. Agreement to Marry),16 
                                                                                                                           
3.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 et seq. (2013). 
4.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 et seq. (2013). 
5.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶ 19. 
6.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (Alienation of Affections) and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 (Criminal 
Conversation) 
7.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (Alienation of Affections) and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/4 (Criminal 
Conversation). 
8.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶¶ 18-31.  Plaintiff conceded the constitutionality of the punitive 
damages exclusion.  Id. at 12. 
9.  Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296 (1946) (Heart Balm Act, ILL. REV. STAT. 1943, ch. 38, pars. 246.1 and 
246.2). 
10.    Id. at 299. 
11.  Id.  
12.  Id.  
13.  Id.  
14.  Id.  
15.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 et seq. 









and Criminal Conversation17 Acts, each containing certain damage 
exclusions.  In 1958, in Smith v. Hill, the court ruled on a woman’s claim for 
breach of promise to marry against a man under the new Breach of Promise 
Act after she bore his child.18  That Act limited recoverable damages to 
“actual damages.”19  The Act specifically excluded “punitive, exemplary, 
vindictive or aggravated damages.”20  This exclusion was sustained as there 
was “no vested right” to such damages.21  Heck was distinguishable because 
in Smith, “actual damages” were recoverable.22 
In 1960, in Siegall v. Solomon,23 the court ruled on a man’s claim 
against another man under the Alienation of Affections Act.  That Act 
allowed recovery of “actual damages,” but denied recovery for not only 
“punitive, exemplary, vindictive or aggravated damages,” but also for 
“mental anguish,” plaintiff’s “feelings,” “shame, humiliation, sorrow, or 
mortification . . . defamation or injury to the good name or character of 
plaintiff or his or her spouse . . . [and] dishonor to plaintiff’s family.”24  As 
the high court found no continuing allegations as to actual damages outside 
of the statutory damage exclusions,25 it focused on whether those actual 
damage exclusions destroy “vested rights” and impair “the obligation of 
contract.”26  As to vested rights, the court deemed it could find “the 
contention abandoned.”27  Moreover, the court proceeded to find no 
deprivation of “vested rights” or of a remedy by which to recover for a 
wrong.”28  The court stated that it was “the modern view” that “rights of a 
husband in his wife’s affections and society are not property within the due 
process clause, so as to prevent a State’s regulation and control of such 
rights.”29  The court found Smith “indistinguishable” on the vested right 
issue.30  It did rather sweepingly declare that under Smith, “a statute which 
                                                                                                                           
17.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 et seq. 
18.  Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 590-1 (1958). 
19.  Id. at 593 (ILL. REV. STAT. 1955, ch. 89, pars. 25-34). 
20.  Id. at 593. 
21.  Id. at 595. 
22.  Id. at 597.  Actual damages for breaches of promises to marry are often not available in other 
American states.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.4; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. § 207, 47A; N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 80-a; and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29.  Evidently, there and elsewhere, state 
constitutional remedial rights do not exist or have not been litigated or have been read differently 
than in Heck. 
23.  Siegall v. Solomon 19 Ill. 2d 145, 147-8 (1960). 
24.  Id. at 147 (ILL. REV. STAT. 1947, chap. 68, pars. 34-7). 
25.  Id. at 148 (“No issue was raised as to whether any portion of the prayer embraced a claim for actual 
damages and thus we deem the question waived.”). 
26.  Id. at 149. 
27.  Id. (“We . . . would be justified in deeming the contention abandoned.”). 
28.    Id. at 148. 
29.  Id. at 149. 
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does not prohibit an action, but merely denies certain damages as a basis for 
recovery, could not be in contravention” of the constitutional remedial 
right.31  The court did not go further by explicitly declaring that the exclusion 
of only punitive damages, as in Smith where all actual damages seemingly 
were available, was comparable to the exclusion of punitive and some actual 
damages, as in Siegall.  Further, the court did not expressly hold that the 
General Assembly could exclude certain actual damages for claims 
encompassing “vested rights,” as with claims that, unlike alienation of 
affections, involve property, and in the “modern” sense warrant a sense of 
justice per Heck. 
As noted in Murphy, the three Supreme Court precedents have been 
read to sustain broad General Assembly power to exclude certain actual 
damages for certain claims.  Actual damage and punitive damage exclusions 
are sometimes not distinguished.  In a 1970 alienation of affections case, the 
Illinois First District Appellate Court summarily opined that a claimant’s 
mental illness treatment expenses, as well as the claimant’s lost earnings and 
profits, were statutorily excluded.32  In 1974, the Fourth District, in another 
alienation of affections case, simply followed the 1970 precedent.33  And in 
1981, in another alienation of affections case, the Second District found that 
losses of spousal income were recoverable as actual damages, but that losses 
of consortium were not recoverable.34 
Other Supreme Court precedents, incidentally, recognize the 
constitutional remedial right may be also limited by immunizing certain 
defendants from liability, even where claimants with injuries caused by 
wrongs may be left with no one to sue and thus no remedy.  In 1984 the 
Supreme Court sustained a statute abolishing earlier recognized tort 
liabilities for landowners, and their lessees and occupants, for injuries to 
snowmobilers caused by land conditions.35  Then, in 1988, the court sustained 
a public transit authority’s immunity from tort claims involving passengers 
assaulted by fellow passengers or others.36  Thus, the Illinois constitutional 
right to “a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs” bars neither 
certain immunity from liability nor certain damage exclusions.37 
                                                                                                                           
31.  Id. 
32.  Kniznik v. Quick, 130 Ill. App. 2d 273, 289 (1st Dist. 1970) (cited in Murphy v. Colson, 2013 IL 
App (2d) 130291, ¶ 31). 
33.  Wheeler v. Fox, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1093 (4th Dist. 1974) (cited in Murphy v. Colson, 2013 IL 
App (2d) 130291, ¶ 31). 
34.  Coulter v. Renshaw, 94 Ill. App. 3d 93, 95-97 (2nd Dist. 1981) (disagreeing with the dictum in 
Kniznik, 130 Ill. App. 2d 273, 280). 
35.  Ostergren v. Forest Preserve Dist., 104 Ill. 2d 128 (1984). 
36.  Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 125 Ill. 2d 230, 247 (1988) (immunity statute, as in Ostergren, may 
foreclose an injured person from pursuing any cause of action though an immunized person was 
negligent). 









B.  The Murphy Ruling 
As noted, in Murphy the actual, or noneconomic compensatory, damage 
exclusions in the Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Acts 
were challenged.38  A former husband sued his former wife’s alleged 
paramour under the Acts, as well as for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.39 
In Murphy, plaintiff essentially acknowledged strict application of the 
Siegall ruling would bar his argument.40  Nontheless, he urged Siegall was 
“implicitly overruled by subsequent supreme court rulings” which held 
unconstitutional certain noneconomic statutory damage caps.41  The Murphy 
court deemed these rulings were not “controlling,”42 finding inapplicable 
their foundations in separation of powers and special legislation rationales.43  
The Murphy court deemed that damage caps were not always analogous to 
damage exclusions.44 
The Murphy court reviewed the damage cap rulings in light of Heck, 
Smith and Siegall.  As to the latter three cases, the courts’ peripheral 
observations leave certain remedial right questions unresolved.  The Murphy 
court noted, “interestingly,” the dissent in the later caps case observed that 
nothing in the separation of powers doctrine precludes the General Assembly 
from eliminating all noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions.45  
However, the Murphy court did not recognize that in the first caps case, the 
high court observed that “legislative limits upon certain types of damages 
may be permitted, such as damages recoverable in statutory causes of 
action.”46  Medical malpractice actions are not statutory causes of action in 
Illinois.47 
                                                                                                                           
38.  Plaintiff accepted “the Acts’ exclusion of punitive damages.”  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291,  
¶ 12. 
39.  Id. at ¶ 5 (the claim for intentional distress infliction was not at issue). 
40.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
41.  Id. at ¶ 14 (referencing both Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). 
42.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
43.  Id. at ¶¶ 33-42. 
44.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
45.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
46.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 415. 
47.  Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (in striking 
statutory damage limits on special legislation grounds, court finds medical malpractice claims, 
unlike dramshop claims, are not “purely statutory “ and thus are not “subject to recovery limitations 
imposed by the legislature”).  The phrase “statutory cause of action” thus does not simply refer to a 
cause of action or a claim that is set out in statute.  Rather, it encompasses a claim whose general 
procedures significantly lie within special statutes outside the Civil Practice Law (i.e., Article II of 
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, per 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101(b)) and are often deemed 
“sui generis” (i.e., People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175 (1989) (juvenile delinquency 
and post-conviction relief proceedings are “sui generis”)).  Here, the General Assembly may cut off 
a claimant’s right to pursue a statutory remedy having no counterpart in common law.  As the court 
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In the second caps case, the Murphy majority noted that Siegall was 
deemed to have not been undermined.48  In that caps case the court did 
recognize the General Assembly could alter the common law and change or 
limit available remedies, but only within constitutional bounds.49  The second 
case drew upon the first caps case50 where the only example of a precedent 
recognizing such legislative authority involved the Worker’s Compensation 
Act.  This Compensation Act not only involves damage limits, but also 
removal of claims entirely from the Circuit Court authority—a far different 
legislative exercise than a damage cap or a damage exclusion in a circuit 
court civil action (particularly an action with deep roots in common law and 
not a statutory cause of action).51 
                                                                                                                           
  Although the legislature has no authority to limit the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts 
to hear justiciable matters, it may create a justiciable matter—and thereby expand the jurisdiction of 
the circuit court—by enacting a statute that creates rights or duties that did not exist, and had no 
counterpart, in the common law or equity . . .  While the circuit court’s original jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the matter derives from the constitution in such instances, the justiciable matter itself is 
defined by the statute . . .  The legislature may define the justiciable matter in such a manner as to 
limit or preclude the circuit court’s authority, and where the justiciable matter is so defined, the 
circuit court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction and must proceed within the strictures 
of the statute . . .  That is, since the justiciable matter is statutory in origin, the legislature may impose 
non-waivable conditions precedent to the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
  See also Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53 (1979) (special statutory procedures “not 
uncommon” in marriage dissolution, adoption, eminent domain and taxpayer cases); 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/1-108(b) (recognizing governance of special statutory procedures outside Code of Civil 
Procedure); and ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1 (court rules “govern all proceedings in the trial court, except to 
the extent that the procedure in a particular kind of action is regulated by a statute other than the 
Civil Practice Law”).  And see McKeown v. Homoya, 209 Ill. App. 959, 154 Ill. Dec. 528, 568 
N.E.2d 528, 529 (5th Dist. 1991) (in finding no constitutional remedial right at issue, court observes:  
“Because the Dramshop Act is a purely statutory cause of action, the legislature can choose to 
abrogate available remedies through subsequent legislation . . .  More importantly, as the legislature 
is the only entity with power to set the terms of recovery and liability without interference from the 
courts for an action unknown at common law, the freedom with which we may act to alleviate 
perceived injustices is thereby restricted.”).  Outside of Illinois, statutory causes of action are 
expressly delineated, as in the Comment to Rule 1-001 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 
(special cases and proceedings include election; probate; Workers’ Compensation; zoning; 
arbitration; declaratory judgment; adoption; garnishment; certain tax matters; and condemnation).  
See also Sanders v, Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 202-04 (Mo. 2012) (rejecting jury trial challenge to 
statutory cap on noneconomic damages for Wrongful Death claim as such a claim, even when 
involving medical malpractice prompting death, is a statutory cause, not a common law cause) and 
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (state constitutional right to 
trial by jury renders invalid a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in cases involving medical 
negligence), as well as Schroeder v. Weighall, 316 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2014) (statute tolling minor’s 
claims, except those in medical malpractice, violates state constitutional “privileges or immunities” 
clause as medical malpractice is “rooted in the common law tradition” and statute is not sustainable 
as more than a rational basis is needed [i.e., a “reasonable ground” which may not be a legislative 
choice based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data]). 
48.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶ 36. 
49.  Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 245 (2010). 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 245 (citing Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 408, which cited Gran Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Industrial 









C.  Other Pre-Murphy Precedents on Illinois Constitutional Constraints on 
Statutory Damage Exclusions 
Beyond the Illinois constitutional remedial right, the Murphy court52 
recognized there were other Illinois constitutional constraints on statutory 
damage limits.  Another limit was separation of powers which has twice 
served to invalidate statutory damage caps.53  Here, certain actual damages 
are not wholly excluded, but rather are subject to a cap to be imposed by a 
trial judge upon a jury verdict exceeding the cap, which was unknown to the 
jurors.54  Such a damage limit has been viewed as “legislative remittitur” that 
“unduly encroaches upon the fundamentally judicial prerogative of 
determining whether a jury’s assessment of damages is excessive with the 
meaning of the law.”55 
Another constitutional constraint on statutory damage limits is the 
mandate against special legislation, which the Murphy court noted has “the 
same standards as an equal protection challenge.”56  To prevail, a claimant 
must show an arbitrary statutory classification discriminating in favor of a 
select group to the exclusion of others similarly situated when they all pursue 
                                                                                                                           
the police power in limiting liability of an employer for injuries sustained by an employee during 
the course of his or her employment”).  Differences between common law claims protected by the 
Illinois constitutional remedial right and unprotected statutory claims also are important when courts 
consider whether to apply retroactively a new, and shorter, statutory time period within which to 
sue.  See, e.g., Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill.2d 342, 122 N.E.2d 513 (1954) (amendment to Liquor 
Control Act applied retroactively; court recognizes “the concept of ‘vested right’ is fraught with 
vagaries that defy precise definition” though no such right had been found in a Wrongful Death Act 
claim for a death occurring outside of Illinois); People v. Robinson, 140 Ill. App. 3d 29, 94 Ill. Dec. 
387, 487 N.E.2d 1264 (4th Dist. 1986) (employing Orlicki in a statutory postconviction relief case 
which was not derived from common law); and Moore v. Jackson Park Hospital, 95 Ill.2d 223, 69 
Ill. Dec. 191, 447 N.E.2d 408 (1983) (distinguishing Orlicki as here “these plaintiffs’ actions . . . 
were recognized at common law). 
  Outside of Illinois, other state constitutional remedial rights have yielded to damage limits for 
claims pursued in the general jurisdiction trial courts, but at times only after a determination is made 
that the common law modification “is reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the 
public welfare” and there is a General Assembly substitution of “an adequate statutory remedy for 
the modification to the individual right at issue.”  Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1113-14 (Kan. 
2012) (upholding statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions when 
challenged on constitutional jury trial and remedial right grounds). 
52.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶¶ 32-42. 
53.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 384 (invalidating a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in all common law, 
statutory or other actions for damages on account of death, bodily injury or physical damage to 
property based on negligence, or product liability) and Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 228 (invalidating a 
$1,000,000 cap on an award against a hospital and a $500,000 cap on an award against a physician 
for non-economic damages arising out of medical malpractice). 
54.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 414 (cap is “mandatory”); Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 229. 
55.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 414 (quoted in Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 235). 
56.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶ 39 (citing Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393).  The special legislation 
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the same claim.57  Damage caps can be such an invalid classification, but 
under Murphy, damage exclusions usually cannot.58  
The jury trial right constraint on statutory damage limits was not 
recognized in Murphy.  In Best, the first damage cap invalidation case, the 
high court specifically noted its failure to determine whether the jury trial 
right could invalidate a statutory damage cap.  It noted that elsewhere a 
comparable state constitutional bar operates.59   
In Illinois, a post-Best statutory damage cap, set out in percentage of 
fault, has been upheld.  In Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp.,60 the 
court sustained a statute modifying the common law rule of joint and several 
liability by establishing only several liability for nonmedical damages for any 
tortfeaser whose percentage of total attributable fault was less than twenty 
five percent.61  The plaintiff in Unzicker would never fully recover 
noneconomic damages as the party primarily responsible (99%) for fault was 
the plaintiff’s employer, whose monetary responsibilities were limited by the 
worker’s compensation scheme.62  This ruling was untouched in the second 
damage cap case, Lebron,63 where the court found the statute did not prompt 
a judgment at variance with a jury determination and did not supplant a trial 
judge’s role in limiting jury awards deemed excessive under the evidence.  In 
Unzicker, as in Murphy, the Illinois constitutional jury trial right was not 
expressly considered.64 
  
                                                                                                                           
57.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶ 42. 
58.  Id.  (under Best, damage caps unfairly prevent “plaintiffs who had been greatly harmed from being 
fully compensated but did not prevent plaintiffs who had been minimally harmed from being fully 
compensated;” but under Best, in a damage exclusion setting, a court should not compare plaintiffs 
in one tort to plaintiffs in another tort who had endured a similar level and type of harm”). 
59.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 414 (citing Sofie v. Fireboard Corp. 112 Wash. 2d 636 (1989) (finding a 
Washington statute unconstitutional). More recent non-Illinois precedents include Watts, 376 
S.W.3d at 640-41 (citing Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d 636 and Taylor v. King, 345 S.W.3d 1237 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
60.  Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64 (2002). 
61.  The modification continues in a different form. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (fault assessments 
for plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant except the plaintiff’s 
employer). 
62.  Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 83-84. 
63.  Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 242-43. 
64.  Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 83-95 (court did consider constitutional remedial right, special legislation 
and equal protection, separation of powers and due process).  In the second damage cap invalidation 
case the high court may have been thinking of the Illinois constitutional jury trial right when it 
declined to comment on the constitutionality of several Illinois statutes “which limit common law 









III.  ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATUTORY 
DAMAGE EXCLUSIONS AFTER MURPHY 
In 2013, the Illinois Second District Appellate Court observed in 
Murphy, that Illinois Supreme Court precedents do not preclude the General 
Assembly from “eliminating all non-economic damages” in a medical 
malpractice action.65  However, a more careful examination of precedents 
reveals that only in some settings are statutory damage exclusions 
appropriate.  Comparably, complete damage exclusions prompted by 
statutory eliminations of causes of action, or establishments of immunities 
from causes of action, are also appropriate only sometimes.   
 Statutory damage exclusions for certain claims, as well as complete 
statutory bars to suit due to the absence under statute of any duty or the 
presence under statute of an immunity, seem generally authorized, 
notwithstanding the constitutional remedial right, only when the effected 
claim or damage request has no strong roots in the common law.  Such roots 
at times are described as establishing a “vested right.” 
 As to statutory damage exclusions, Smith established in 1958, that 
punitive damages may be barred as there is no “vested right” in them even 
where actual damages are recoverable.66  Siegall established in 1960, that 
certain actual damages (such as “mental anguish”) may be barred though 
other actual damages are recoverable.67  Yet, Siegall should be read narrowly, 
as it excluded only certain actual damages for claims where there were no 
“vested rights.”68  More importantly, the statute in Siegall employed 
outdated, and seemingly substantively unconstitutional, “property” 
descriptions.  Recall that Siegall involved a husband’s claim involving the 
loss of his wife’s affections and society, which she no longer chose to provide 
him because she was in a relationship with another man who the husband had 
sued.69 
As to complete statutory bars to claims due to the lack of duty, Heck 
also involved, as in Siegall, a husband who sued his wife’s suitor.70  The court 
in 1946 sustained “the more grievance complaint” that the Heart Balm Act’s 
elimination of all claims for alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation violated the constitutional remedial right.71  The Heck court 
deemed the Act interfered with the husband’s “contract of marriage” which 
                                                                                                                           
65.  Murphy, 2013 IL App (2d) 130291, ¶ 34 (quoting the dissent in Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 283). 
66.  Smith, 12 Ill. 2d at 595. 
67.  Siegall, 19 Ill. 2d at 150. 
68.  Id. at 149. 
69.  Id. at 147-48. 
70.  Heck, 394 Ill. 2d at 297.  
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“has always been known in the law as a contract involving civil rights just as 
other contracts involve such rights.”72 
Seemingly, the contract of marriage was viewed differently in 1946 by 
Heck, than in 1960 by Siegall.  The Siegall court—unlike the Heck court in—
deemed marriage contracts as only “properly regarded in the law as a civil 
contract for some purposes,” as marriage contracts, unlike many other 
contracts, “do not rest upon the agreement of the parties alone, but upon the 
general law of the State, statutory and common, which defines and prescribes 
those rights, duties and obligations.”73  Of course all contracts, to be 
enforceable or otherwise worthy of respect (as in a claim for interference with 
contractual rights), rest “upon the general law of the State.”74  Unsaid in 
Siegall was the evolving view that marriage no longer prompted a “vested” 
property interest in a husband, that no more could a wife be the chattel of her 
husband per contract.  On the same day as it decided Siegall, the Illinois 
Supreme Court stated in Heckendorn v. First National Bank of Ottawa: 
At common law a married woman had no separate identity before the law; 
she was regarded as a chattel with neither property nor other rights which 
were enforceable against anyone.  Her husband owned all her property and 
asserted all her legal and equitable rights.75 
Unmentioned in both 1960 opinions were the federal and Illinois 
constitutional rights (as with due process and equal protection) that were 
evolving to deny continuing adherence to earlier views of “vested” property 
rights in husbands, which were utilized in earlier cases involving Illinois 
constitutional remedial rights.76 
If complete statutory bars for certain common law claims, and thus 
complete damage exclusions, founded on lack of duty are generally permitted 
notwithstanding the Illinois constitutional remedial right, the strongest 
                                                                                                                           
72.  Id. at 300. 
73.  Siegall, 19 Ill. 2d at 149-50. 
74.    Id. at 150. 
75.  Heckendorn v. First National Bank of Ottawa, 19 Ill. 2d 190, 192 (1960) (both Siegall and 
Heckendorn were initially decided on March 31, 1960). 
76.  Federal constitutional due process should likely play a far lesser role than Illinois constitutional due 
process should play where Illinois statutory damage exclusions are said to be limited by due process 
interests in life, liberty or property deprivations.  See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoeben, Uncommon Law and 
the Bill of Rights:  The Woes of Constitutionalizing State Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 
173, 187 (1992) (“The ‘constitutionalization’ of defamation has taught lessons relevant to the [U.S. 
Supreme] Court’s decisions whether to provide minimal constitutional standards for other areas of 
common law, such as punitive damages.  The Court should not lightly replace the common law 
process of growth and change with federal constitutional requirements.  States can manage tort law 
with minimal supervision and should be allowed to do so.”)  Compare the more sympathetic, but 
still wary, John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right 
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 611-616 (2005) (guidelines suggested for 









precedent is (the often uncited) Clarke v. Storchak, finally decided by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1944.77  In Clarke, the Illinois statute eliminating 
a gratuitous auto guest passenger’s negligence (but not willful and wanton 
misconduct) claim against the host driver was sustained under the 
constitutional remedial right.78  But, unlike Heck’s marriage contract claim, 
the passenger’s negligence claim cannot be characterized as having been 
jettisoned by other, later constitutional developments effectively modifying 
the constitutional remedial right.  Nonetheless, Clarke may not permit 
wholesale statutory damage exclusions via no duty acts because the law at 
issue in Clarke was deemed—by the General Assembly—to be more 
valuable to gratuitous auto passengers than would be any continuing common 
law remedial right.  Without the statutory damage exclusion for a negligence 
claim, the legislature was concerned that drivers who were “charitably 
inclined” to give free rides would “be restrained by fear of the consequences 
of their own charitable act.”79  Thus, effectively the interests of a few free 
ride passengers yielded to the interests of many, many other free ride 
passengers—a balance the court in Clarke found promoted “the best interests 
of people in their relations to each other.”80  By contrast, pedestrians (or 
passengers) hurt by (non-host) negligent auto drivers may not be able to be 
statutorily stripped of their common law remedies as many other pedestrians 
(or non-guest passengers) would not be benefitted.  In some (but not all) 
ways, gratuitous passengers and their host drivers were treated like 
employees and their employers have been treated in the worker’s 
compensation scheme.  In the worker’s scheme, some workers lost their 
common law claims in order to benefit all workers.81 Clarke may allow 
damage limits, including limits on entire claims, for those injured persons 
with otherwise available constitutional remedial rights where new statutory 
benefits—of at least comparable value—are provided the broader classes of 
persons in which the injured reside.  Statutory alterations of constitutional 
remedial rights seemingly may also be allowed when common law claims are 
deemed preempted by new written laws—which must significantly advance 
the interests of those whose common law claims are extinguished,82 and 
                                                                                                                           
77.  Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564 (1943). 
78.  Id. at 571, 574-80. 
79.  Id. at 579. 
80.  Id. at 579. 
81.  See, e.g., Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 291 Ill. 167, 174 (1919) (“The 
employee. . . is no longer able to recover as much as before in case of an injury growing out of the 
employer’s negligence, but he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has a 
certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving 
the amount of the damages . . .  the employer is left without defense respecting the question of fault, 
but he is at the same time assured that the recovery is limited and that it goes directly to the relief of 
the designated beneficiary”). 
82.  On a preempted common law claim see, e.g., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 195 Ill.2d 441 (1983) 
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where such extinctions are measured by a test more rigorous than rational 
basis.83 
Like complete statutory bars founded on no duty, claims against a 
certain defendant can be barred because an immunity is statutorily created. 
Not surprisingly, such bars have been sustained where a claimant has no 
vested property interest because there are no significant common law roots 
supporting the claim or because any common law roots have been made 
irrelevant by later constitutional law developments.  Statutory immunity of 
one spouse from a civil tort action by the other spouse for a tort committed 
“during coverture” was sustained in the 1960 case, Heckendorn v. First 
National Bank of Ottawa, because the claim was “unknown to common 
law”84 and because “no rights had vested” (i.e., the spouse had not been 
harmed, and thus had not sued or obtained a judgment, before the immunity 
was recognized).85 
Statutory immunities for Illinois governments and governmental 
officials have been sustained because “the Illinois Constitution of 1970 
abolished sovereign immunity, in Illinois, except as may be provided by our 
General Assembly through statutory law.”86  Provisions can be made 
legislatively for both state and local governments.87  These provisions have 
been read not to incorporate the common law discretionary/ministerial 
distinction operating for the common law’s public official immunity 
doctrine.88 
Beyond the constitutional remedial right, other Illinois constitutional 
constraints can limit statutory damage exclusions, including separation of 
powers; due process; special legislation/equal protection; and jury trial rights.  
For now those limits seem less likely to be utilized by Illinois courts than the 
constitutional remedial right, at least when the exclusion operates for claims 
in Illinois circuit courts with deep roots in the common law; where there have 
                                                                                                                           
regarding liability claims of their insureds, preempts tort claims for intentional inflictions of 
emotional distress). 
83.  On such a constitutional measure, see, e.g., Schroeder, 316 P.3d at ¶ 15 (“reasonable ground,” not 
“rational basis,” test when statute alters common law claim subject to a state constitutional 
“privileges or immunities” clause). 
84.  Heckendorn, 19 Ill. 2d at 195. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill.2d 370, 375 (1997). 
87.  Id. at 375 (General Assembly used its constitutional prerogative regarding sovereign immunity “with 
regard to local governmental units, through its retention of the Tort Immunity Act”). 
88.  Id. at 580-82.  Elsewhere, the application of an absolute privilege to governmental officials that 
leave aggrieved individuals without remedies had been sustained on “public interest” grounds 
without mention of any constitutional remedial or due process rights of the aggrieved individuals.  
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 2013 WL 6795237, at 6 (Tenn. 2013) (in the Tennessee constitution, 
remedial rights are addressed in Article I, 17 which says: “every man, for injury done him in his 
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law;” it goes on to 
differentiate remedial rights against governments by saying:  “suits may be brought against the State 









been no subsequent overriding constitutional developments (as with 
sovereign immunity resurrections and invalidations of due process interests 
of husbands in possessing their wives as chattel); and thus where vested 
rights (i.e., due process?) may be found.  However, exclusions could be 
sustained where claims are statutorily diverted to alternative89 (to circuit 
court) forums, as done with certain employee claims via worker’s 
compensation, or where classes of potential claimants are provided 
alternative and significant statutory benefits, as with guest passengers.  
However, diversions may be limited to so-called statutory causes of action, 
or at least to claims with no significant roots in common law (as might be 
true not only for ordinary employee tort claims against employers, but also 
for newly-fashioned employee claims against employers, as with race 
discrimination).90 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Illinois constitutional remedial right constrains the General 
Assembly authority to exclude certain actual damages for certain claimants, 
or to exclude all actual damages for certain claimants via no duty or immunity 
laws.  But, the constraints are not wholly clear.91  Too often Illinois courts 
make overly broad pronouncements about legislative authority. A close 
examination of the 2013 Illinois Second District Appellate Court opinion in 
Murphy v. Colson, and of earlier Illinois Supreme Court precedents, reveals 
significant limits in the Illinois constitutional remedial right.  The breadth of 
further constitutional limits (especially special legislation/equality and jury 
trial) remain far less clear. 
 
                                                                                                                           
89.  In Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 283, Justice Karmeier, in dissent, suggested that the General Assembly not 
only could eliminate “all noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases,” but also could 
“abolish civil actions for medical malpractice completely and replace them with a claims system 
comparable to the one it has established for workers compensation.” 
90.  On jury trial rights for common law claims, but not statutory causes of action, see Interstate Bankers 
Cas. Co. v. Hernandez, 2013 IL App (1st) 123035 (Illinois civil jury trial right applies to common 
law claims existing in 1970—when constitutional jury trial right was recognized anew; thus, jury 
trial rights can extend to claims that were not common law claims in 1870 when initial civil jury 
trial right was constitutionally recognized). 
91.  Nationwide, one experienced observer of the limits on state tort laws posed by comparable American 
state constitutional remedial rights described the precedents as a “morass,” confessing “continued 
irresolution” and an inability “to provide final answers.”  Thomas R. Phillips (Chief Justice, Texas 
Supreme Court), The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1339, 1344-45 
(2003). 
